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OHIO APPELLATE PRACTICE BEFORE AND AFTER POLIKOFF:
ARE THINGS REALLY ALL THAT MUCH CLEARER?
by
MICHAEL L. BUENGER*
Accordingly, in the interests of justice, clarity, and judicial economy, we
find that it is time to abandon the balancing test and return to the method
of determining what constitutes a special proceeding that was in use prior
to Amato. We believe a more exacting method of analysis practiced by our
juristic predecessors will resultt
INTRODUCTION
Perhaps no topic in Ohio appellate practice is more confusing than de-
termining what constitutes a final, appealable order in a special proceeding.
While those who do not regularly appear before the state's appellate courts
may liken deliberations on this matter to the old medieval question of how
many angels can sit on the head of a pin, the issue of what precisely is an order
affecting a substantial right1 entered in a special proceeding Iis complex and
critically important. The ability of a litigant to obtain immediate review of a
trial court order may hinge on an appellate court resolving the difficult ques-
tion of whether the proceeding from which the order emanated constituted a
special proceeding under Ohio law.
* BA, cum laude, University of Dayton, 1983; JD, cum laude, St. Louis University School
of Law, 1989. Court Administrator, Second District Court of Appeals of Ohio.
t Polikoff v. Adam, 616 N.E.2d 213, 217 (Ohio 1993).
1. A substantial right is defined as a legal right that is entitled to the enforcement or
protections of the law. See In re Will of Thomas, 84 N.E.2d 294 (Ohio Ct. App. 1948). See
also Bell v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 616 N.E.2d 181, 184 (Ohio 1993) ("An order which affects a
substantial right has been perceived as one which, if not immediately appealable, would
foreclose appropriate relief in the future."). For further discussion on the Bell decision, see
infra note 129; In re Irvine's Guardianship, 52 N.E.2d 536 (Ohio Ct. App. 1943); See also
Chef Italiano Corp. v. Kent State Univ., 541 N.E.2d 64, 67 (Ohio 1989) (A substantial right is
"'a legal right entitled to enforcement an protection by law'.... A court order which deprives
a person of a remedy which he would otherwise possess deprives a person of a substantial
right.").
2. The General Assembly has never defined the term "special proceeding." However, the
supreme court recently defined a special proceeding as a proceeding not recognized at common
law or equity and which was specially created by statute. Polikoff v. Adam, 616 N.E.2d 213,
217 (Ohio 1993). See infra text accompanying note 72 and following.
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The Supreme Court of Ohio, recognizing the difficulty in determining
finality in a special proceeding has, like the appellate courts, struggled to
articulate clearer guidelines and a more precise standard for resolving the
question. The supreme court's most recent attempt to provide guidance in this
area is Polikoff v. Adam.3 However, rather than laying a foundation for
clearer guidelines leading to a more consistent jurisprudence, the Polikoff
decision further confuses the question of what is a special proceeding, fore-
closes examination of some types of orders requiring immediate appellate
review because of their effect, and elevates the form of the underlying action
over the substantive rights of the litigants affected by a trial court order.4
I. THE FINAL ORDER RULE
A. Ohio's Unique Perspective
The difficulty in determining whether an order or judgment is appealable
is complex due to the very precise language of Article IV, Section 3 of the
Ohio Constitution' and the imprecise definition of a final order contained in
section 2505.02, of the Ohio Code.6 While the constitutional provision ex-
pressly limits the appellate jurisdiction of courts of appeals to reviewing judg-
ments and final orders, the statute is hardly a hallmark of clarity and precision
in defining precisely what is a final order.' Consequently, courts have re-
solved questions of finality on a case-by-case basis thereby producing what
appears at times to be a confusing trail of decisions on what constitutes an
3.616 N.E.2d 213 (Ohio 1993).
4. See Indiana Ins. Co. v. Carnegie Constr. Co., 632 N.E.2d 579 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993)
"Thus, while we believe that the proceeding at bar was in substance an independent
judicial inquiry of insurance coverage issues in the nature of a declaratory judgment
action, it was not in form an action specially created by statute and thus not a special
proceeding pursuant to the explicit holding of Polikoff.... Instead, this court is forced
to elevate form over substance in holding that the order herein is not a final appealable
order merely because the proceeding in which it was issued was not titled a declaratory
judgment action."
Id. at 582. See infra text accompanying notes 97-103.
5. See infra text accompanying note 11.
6. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2505.02 (Anderson 1991) defines a final order as:
An order that affects a substantial right in an action which in effect determines the
action and prevents a judgment, an order that affects a substantial right made in a special
proceeding or upon a summary application in an action after judgment, or an order that
vacates or sets aside a judgment or grants a new trial is a final order that may be reviewed,
affirmed, modified, or reversed, with or without retrial.
7.The very broad and arguably simple Ohio rule contrasts sharply with the more
sophisticated jurisdictional statutes of other states. See infra notes 16-18.
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order affecting a substantial right,8 or even what comprises a special proceed-
ing.9 What seems like a non-final order in one context, may be a final order
in the context of a special proceeding. 0
To appreciate the impact of the Polikoff decision, it is important to un-
derstand Ohio's somewhat unique perspective on final, appealable orders.
The Ohio Constitution states, in relevant part:
Courts of appeals shall have such jurisdiction as may be provided by
law to review and affirm, modify, or reverse judgments orfinal orders of
the courts of record inferior to the court of appeals within the district and
shall have such appellate jurisdiction as may be provided by law to review
and affirm, modify, or reverse final orders or actions of administrative
officers or agencies." [emphasis added].
Under the Ohio Constitution and various enabling statutes, 2 the appellate
jurisdiction of courts of appeals is strictly limited to reviewing judgments and
final orders.'3 This is the "final order rule."
8. See discussion supra note 1.
9. Compare Amato v. General Motors Corp., 423 N.E.2d 452 (Ohio 1981) with Polikoff v.
Adam, 616 N.E. 2d 213 (Ohio 1993) (overruling Amato).
10. There are several examples of this. An order to compel discovery in a common law
tort action for medical malpractice is not immediately appealable. See Cotterman v. Lowe,
Miami App. No. 93-CA-48, unreported (Jan. 1994) (discussed infra notes 103 & 110); but cf.
Niemann v. Cooley, Nos. C-920470 & C-920457, 1994 WL 19103 (Ohio Ct. App. ) (Jan. 26,
1994). On the other hand, a similar order entered in a declaratory judgment action or on an
application for prejudgment interest may be immediately appealed because such actions are
special statutory proceedings. See infra text accompanying note 115 and following.
11. OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 3(B)(2).
12. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2501.02 (Anderson 1991) states that in addition to the
original jurisdiction conferred by OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 3, appellate courts have jurisdiction:
Upon an appeal upon questions of law to review, affirm, modify, set aside, or reverse
judgments or final orders of courts of record inferior to the court or appeals within the
district, including the finding, order, or judgment of a juvenile court that a child is
delinquent, neglected, abused, or dependent, for prejudicial error committed by such
lower court.
13. Except for certain appeals by a prosecuting attorney, the "final order rule" requires
that all appeals involve final orders. The supreme court by rule allows prosecuting attorneys
to appeal orders in a criminal case that (1) sustain a motion to suppress evidence, or (2)
sustain a motion for return of property. Ohio R. Crim. P. 12(J). In either event, the prosecuting
attorney must certify that the trial court's order "has rendered the state's proof with respect to
that charge so weak in its entirety that any reasonable possibility of effective prosecution has
been destroyed." Id. One could argue that Ohio R. Crim. P. 12(J) is at odds with Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 2505.02 (Anderson 1991) which allows for appeals from judgments and final
orders only. However, an order granting either type of motion is in effect a final order
because it deprives the state of evidence needed to effectively proceed with its case-in-chief.
If the state were forced to proceed to trial without the suppressed evidence and the trial
ultimately resulted in an acquittal, then any appeal by the state would be purely advisory.
Summer, 1994]
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Ohio's perspective on finality differs substantially from many of its
neighbors. In Ohio, the requirement of finality before appeal is so strong that
there is arguably no appeal of an interlocutory order.1 4 An order appealed to
an appellate court can only meet the requirements of Section 2505.02 of the
Ohio Code by falling within the definition of a judgment or final order. 5 By
contrast, several of Ohio's neighbors allow appeals of interlocutory orders.
Indiana, for example, empowers its appellate courts to review several types
of interlocutory orders including orders that involve substantial questions of
law, the resolution of which will lead to a more orderly disposition of the case
and orders for which remedy by appeal after final judgment is not practi-
cable. 16 Michigan and Pennsylvania vest their appellate courts with some
discretion to grant leave to appeal certain types of interlocutory orders. 7
The constitutional ban on double jeopardy would prohibit the state from retrying the
defendant even if the order suppressing evidence were reversed on appeal. See generally
State v. Caltrider, 331 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1975).
14. But see discussion supra note 13.
15. See Ohio Nat' Life Ins. Co. v. Struble, 76 N.E. 2d 420 (Ohio Ct. App. 1947):
A final decree is one which determines and disposes of the whole merits of the cause
before the court or a branch of the cause which is separate and distinct from the other
parts of the case, reserving no further questions or directions for future determination:
so that it will not be necessary to bring the cause or that separate branch of the cause
again before the court for further decision.
Id. at 453 (citing Teaff v. Hewitt, I Ohio St. 511 (1853)). See also Cleveland, Columbus &
Cincinnati Highway, Inc. v. Public Util. Comm'n. of Ohio, 49 N.E.2d 759 (Ohio 1943).
16. IND. R. APP. P. 4 states that interlocutory appeals may be taken in the following cases:
(1) for the payment of money or to compel the execution of any instrument of writing, or
the delivery or assignment of any securities, evidence of debt, documents or things in action;
(2) for the delivery of the possession of real estate; (3) from orders granting, refusing to
grant, or dissolving or refusing to dissolve preliminary injunctions; (4) from orders on writs
of habeas corpus; (5) from orders transferring or refusing to transfer a case under Trial Rule
75; and (6) from any other interlocutory order if the trial court certifies and the appellate
court finds (a) the appellant will suffer substantial expense, damage or injury if determination
of the propriety of the order waits until after a final judgment, or (b) the order involves a
substantial question of law the determination of which will lead to the orderly disposition of
the case, or (c) remedy by appeal after final judgment is not practicable.
17. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.308 (West Supp. 1993) provides for appeals as of right
from: (1) all final judgments except those arising from violations of traffic ordinances, and
(2) judgments from orders of the probate court as provided in Section 861. Other appeals
may be taken with leave of the appellate court in the following circumstances: (1) from the
circuit court when the appeal involves (a) an order, judgment or sentence by the probate court
under section 863(1) and (2), (b) a final order or judgment of the district court appealed to the
circuit court, (c) an order of the municipal court, and (d) a conviction for a traffic violation
from the recorder's court of the city of Detroit if entered before September 1, 1981; or (2) an
order of the probate court certified under Section 863(3); or (3) certain final judgments or
orders from the recorder's court of the city of Detroit; or (4) such other judgments or
interlocutory orders as the Supreme Court of Michigan may provide for by rule.
In Pennsylvania, not only are appellate courts vested by statute with broad jurisdiction
to review interlocutory orders (42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 702 (1989)), the Pennsylvania
[Vol. 28:1
4
Akron Law Review, Vol. 28 [1995], Iss. 1, Art. 1
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol28/iss1/1
OHIO APPELLATE PRACTICE
Kentucky and Michigan empower their supreme courts to determine by rule
what types of interlocutory orders are subject to immediate review.' 8 In Ohio,
however, every order appealed must possess the characteristics of finality
under Ohio Rev. Code §2505.02 and its accompanying case law as a predicate
to the exercise of appellate jurisdiction. 19
Ohio's requirement that every order be final to be appealable may derive
from a view espoused very early in its history: "The nature of appeals in this
state differs from appeals in many other states. The effect of an appeal, un-
der our system, is to vacate the order, decision or decree appealed from, and
to carry the cause into the appellate court, both upon the law and facts, the
same as if no decision had been made. Hence, under our system, it has uni-
formly been held that no appeals are allowable, except from such decisions as
are, in their nature, final. ' ' 20  Thus, the difference between Ohio's view of
finality and that of its neighbors was not the result of happenstance, but of a
systemic court structure that viewed appeals as a mechanism for de novo
review of the action.
Rules of Appellate Procedure authorize appeals from final orders generally (PA. R. APP. P.
341), appeals from final distribution orders (PA. R. APP. P. 342), appeals from orders
challenging a plea of guilty (PA. R. APP. P. 343), interlocutory appeals as of right (PA. R.
APP. P. 311), and interlocutory appeals with leave of court (PA. R. APP. P. 312). Included in
interlocutory appeals as of right are generally appeals from orders (1) refusing to open, vacate
or strike a judgment, (2) confirming, modifying, dissolving or refusing to do so an attachment,
custodianship, receivership or other matter affecting control of property, (3) changing venue
in a criminal proceeding, (4) granting, dissolving, modifying an injunction or refusing to do
so, (5) granting a new trial , (6) directing a partition, (7) sustaining venue of the matter or
jurisdiction of the person or property, (8) changing venue in a civil proceeding, (9) that will
terminate or substantially handicap a criminal prosecution, (10) overruling preliminary
objections in an eminent domain case, (11) of the common pleas court or other government
unit remanding a matter to an administrative agency, or (12) any other order made appealable
by statute. Appeals from other types of interlocutory orders may be taken with leave of court.
18. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22A.020(2) (Baldwin 1988) states that appellate courts have
jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders as the supreme court may establish by rule. KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 22A.020(4) (Baldwin 1988) allows the state to take an immediate appeal
in certain criminal proceedings subject to certain conditions. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22.020(5)
(Baldwin 1988) allows any party aggrieved by a judgment of the circuit court in a case
appealed thereto from an inferior court to seek a writ of certiorari in the Court of Appeals.
Although empowered to provide for review of interlocutory orders by rule, the Kentucky
Supreme Court has exercised this power with great restraint.
19. Ohio courts have long taken the position that what constitutes a final order is within
the province of the judiciary. See Price v. McCoy Sales & Serv. Inc., 207 N.E.2d 236 (Ohio
1965); Hoffman v. Knollman, 20 N.E.2d 221 (Ohio 1939). However, by constitutional law,
the legislature has the prerogative to determine what types of final orders can be appealed.
See Klein v. Bendix-Westinghouse Co., 234 N.E.2d 587 (Ohio 1968). For a general discussion
on what constitutes a final order, see generally WILLIAM H. WOLFF, JR. & JAMES A. BROGAN,
APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN OHIO, §§ 3.01, & 3.03-3.05 (1993). Some cases
listed in § 3.05 are no longer valid in the aftermath of the Polikoff decision.
20. Aultman, Miller & Co. v. Assignees of J.F. Seiberling Co., 31 Ohio St. 201, 204-205
Summer, 1994]
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Ohio's perspective on the function of an appeal, and the resulting finality
requirement, may stem largely from the fact that truly independent interme-
diate appellate courts have existed in Ohio only since 1912. Prior to this time,
appellate jurisdiction was vested in the supreme court and a variety of hybrid
courts often consisting of common pleas court judges from the same counties
where cases were tried. 21 Under the first constitution adopted in 1802, all
judicial power was vested in the supreme court, courts of common pleas, and
justices of the peace.22 The supreme court - sitting as the highest court of a
county - had original and appellate jurisdiction over common law and chan-
cery cases, and exclusive jurisdiction over the trial of divorce, alimony and
capital cases.2 3 Thus, in many instances the supreme court sat as little more
than a super trial court.24 The court of common pleas was the general trial
court of Ohio having original jurisdiction over all cases not otherwise within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the supreme court or the justices of the peace.25
The only review and retrial available was to the supreme court of the county
in which the trial took place,2 6 although courts of common pleas apparently
had some limited power to review the judgments of justices of the peace.
Under this court structure, conflicts in decisions between the trial courts were
generally not subject to review by a higher court.27
(1877). See also Mitchell v. Crain, 161 N.E.2d 80 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
21. The first appellate courts in the state were the district courts which consisted of one
supreme court justice and several judges of the common pleas court. The district courts were
replaced by the circuit courts in 1883. The circuit courts were then replaced in 1912 with the
intermediate district courts of appeals. The 1912 amendment to the constitution providing
for intermediate appellate state courts is the foundation of Ohio's modern courts of appeals.
See generally Lee E. Skeel, Constitutional History of Ohio Appellate Courts, 6 CLEVE. MAR.
L. REV. 323 (1957).
22. See generally id. at 324. OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 1 now provides, "The judicial power
of the state is vested in a supreme court, courts of appeals, courts of common pleas and
divisions thereof, and such other courts inferior to the supreme court as may from time to
time be established by law."
23. Skeel, supra note 21, at 324.
24. The first supreme court sat as a circuit court riding to each county to hear both cases
within its exclusive and original jurisdiction as well as appeals from the decisions of the
common pleas courts. Id.
25. Id.
26. Under the 1802 constitution, the supreme court was required to hold at least one term
in each county of the state. Id. The county orientation of Ohio courts is still evident. OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2501.05 (Anderson 1991) provides, in part, "The court of appeals shall
hear each cause in the county in which the cause originated, unless, for good cause shown,
the court of appeals determines that the cause may be heard in another county of the district."
Furthermore, the operational expenses of the courts of appeals, including compensation for
constables, are paid by the counties forming the district. See § 2501.18 & § 2501.181. The
clerk of courts of the common pleas court of a county serves as the clerk of the court of
appeals for that county. See also § 2501.16.
27. Skeel, supra note 21, at 324. In fact, there was not even a requirement that reviewing
[Vol. 28:1
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In 1851, Ohio amended the constitution to provide for nine judicial dis-
tricts each having a district court comprised of one justice of the supreme
court and two common pleas judges for the district. This was the first attempt
at creating an intermediate appellate court. As of 1852, the jurisdiction of the
district court was:
Appeals may be taken from all final judgments in civil cases at law,
decrees in chancery and interlocutory decrees dissolving injunctions
rendered by the court of common pleas, and superior and commercial
courts... in which said courts have original jurisdiction by any party
against whom such judgment or decree shall be rendered or who may be
affected thereby, to the district court and, the cause so appealed shall be
again tried, heard and decided in the district in the same manner as
though said district court had original jurisdiction of the cause. 28
Thus, effectively, an appeal to the district court was not only an opportunity
for the parties to obtain review of the lower court proceedings, but also an
opportunity for a complete retrial of the action in a trial de novo.29 Up until
1853, cases at law 30 could be retried to a jury and cases in equity 31 could be
retried to the court. 32 After 1853, retrial on issues of fact was not available
except in those cases where the litigants were not entitled to a trial by jury in
the first instance. 33 Due to the de novo nature of review in Ohio's early dis-
trict courts, it was only logical that a strong finality requirement - except in
courts issue an opinion. Currently, under OHIO R. APP. P. 12(A), appellate courts must decide
each assignment of error, unless an assignment is rendered moot by the resolution of another
assignment of error, and "give reasons in writing for its determination." Id. (emphasis added).
28. Skeel, supra note 21, at 326 (quoting the March 1852 statute defining district court
jurisdiction) (emphasis added).
29. Id. at 326. See also Lincoln Prop. Inc. v. Goldslager, 248 N.E.2d 57 (Ohio 1969)
(parties to an appeal on questions of law and fact are entitled to a trial de novo and the
appellate court may not remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings but must
substitute its judgment for that of the trial court in accordance with its independent findings
of fact).
30. The term "cases at law" generally refers to that class of cases filed in courts of law and
which contained the elements of a common law action and for which monetary damages are
generally available. See Commonwealth S.S. Co. v. American Shipbuilding Co., 197 F. 780
(1912).
31. The term "equity case" generally refers to that class of cases filed in the courts and
whose primary goal is to achieve a measure of fairness through a remedy not within the
purview of the courts of law. A court of equity may depart from established legal rules in
order to do justice in special cases. See Dayton & Union Ry. v. Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry.,
15 Ohio Dec. 795 (1900). However, an action in equity cannot be maintained where there
exists an adequate remedy at law. See Haught v. City of Dayton, 295 N.E.2d 404 (Ohio
1973).
32. Skeel, supra note 21, at 326.
33. Id. at 326-327.
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cases of injunctions - evolved. Absent finality in lower court proceedings,
district courts would have to conduct multiple de novo trials of the same
case.
34
Several attempts were made following the formation of the district
courts to create an independent intermediate appellate court system, most
notably in 1883 with the creation of the circuit courts.3" These courts were the
first intermediate appellate courts presided over by judges specially elected
to serve on the court. The purpose of the circuit courts was to relieve some
of the backlog of cases then pending before the supreme court. However,
rather than reducing appeals to the supreme court, the circuit courts actually
contributed to an increase in the number of petitions in error filed in the higher
court.3 6 Moreover, because the circuit courts were under almost complete
34. Cf. Aultman, Miller & Co. v. Assignees of J.F. Seiberling Co., 31 Ohio St. 201 (1877).
35. The circuit courts were vested with the same original jurisdiction as that possessed by
the supreme court, and appellate jurisdiction as might be provided by law. In addition to
special cases providing for appeal (e.g. divorce cases), the circuit courts could also hear
appeals from the final orders of the courts of common pleas of which that court had original
jurisdiction where the right to demand a trial of the facts by jury did not exist. The court
could also hear appeals from final orders or judgments of the common pleas courts upon the
filing of a petition of error. See supra note 32. No limitation was placed on the rights of
litigants to petition the supreme court except for the need to act within the terms of that
court's jurisdiction as then defined. Skeel, supra note 21, at 326-327. See also Ireland v.
Cheney, 196 N.E. 267 (Ohio 1935).
36. Skeel, supra note 21, at 328. At one time there was a distinction between the term
"appeal" from an "error proceeding." "Appeal" in Ohio originally meant a retrial of the
issues of fact in the reviewing court while an "error proceeding" meant a review of the record
made in the trial court on a petition in error. See Lee E. Skeel, Some Aspects of Appellate
Procedure in Ohio, 12 W. RES. U. L. REV. 645, 650 (1961) [hereinafter Skeel, Some Aspects].
The meaning of "appeal" was changed by the General Assembly in 1935 to mean all
proceedings whereby one court reviews or retries an action determined in an inferior court,
administrative agency, tribunal or commission. The General Assembly further distinguished
between "Appeals on questions of law" and "Appeals on questions of law and fact." The
former involved appeals solely on questions of law including the weight and sufficiency of
the evidence, while the latter involved review and retrial on questions of law and fact. 1935
Ohio Laws 104, 104-130, cited in Skeel, Some Aspects supra at 651.
In the years immediately preceding the creation of the circuit courts, Ohio amended
the constitution to provide for a supreme court commission. The commission was designed
to help the supreme court reduce its case backlog by acting almost as an extra supreme court.
Provisions for the creation of this commission still exist in the Ohio constitution. OHIO
CONST. art. IV, § 22 provides, in part:
A commission, which shall consist of five members, shall be appointed by the Governor,
with the advice and consent of the Senate, the members of which shall hold office for
the term of three years from and after the first day of February, 1876, to dispose of such
part of the business then on the dockets of the Supreme Court, as shall, by arrangement
between said commission and said court, be transferred to such commission; and said
commission shall have like jurisdiction and power in respect to such business as are or
may be vested in said court; and the members of said commission shall receive a like
compensation for the time being, with the judges of said court. A majority of the members
[Vol. 28:1
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control of the General Assembly, the jurisdiction of the courts was not always
very clear.3 7 Therefore, a truly independent intermediate appellate court
system did not emerge until 1912 when Ohio amended the constitution to
provide for the current courts of appeals. These courts enjoyed a much greater
degree of constitutional and legislative autonomy than any of its predeces-
sors. 38 Nevertheless, the requirement of finality as a predicate to appeal re-
mained firmly ensconced in Ohio jurisprudence, although its continued rec-
ognition had less to do with the need for finality for trials de novo and more
to do with preventing piecemeal appeals. 39
The modern justification for Ohio's "final order rule" is to prevent liti-
gants from fractionalizing a cause of action. If any order of a trial court could
be appealed immediately, the orderly processing of cases would cease and the
appellate court system would become nothing more than a means for litigants
to delay and to obstruct the ultimate resolution of a lawsuit. Under a system
that allows immediate appellate review of interlocutory orders, in many in-
stances trial courts would have to stay further proceedings and wait for a
determination by the appellate court on the propriety of the order appealed."
Litigation would become a frenzied traffic jam with litigants controlling the
processing of cases and converting the judicial system into a means for ob-
structing their orderly disposition. 41 Such a result is clearly undesirable. As
now applied, the final order rule discourages interlocutory appeals with what
of said commission shall be necessary to form a quorum or pronounce a decision, and its
decisions shall be certified, entered, and enforced as the judgments of the Supreme Court[.]
•.. The General Assembly may, on application of the supreme court duly entered on the
journal of the court and certified, provide by law, whenever two-thirds of [each] house
shall concur therein, from time to time, for the appointment, in like manner, of a like
commission with like powers, jurisdiction, and duties; provided, that the term of any
such commission shall not exceed two years, nor shall it be created oftener than once in
ten years.
Only two such commissions have ever been created in Ohio, one in 1876 and one in 1883.
See Skeel, supra note 21, at 326.
37. The authority of circuit courts - and by extension the courts of appeals - to try cases
de novo was not very clear. As late as 1946 the supreme court held that, at least in regards to
chancery cases, the intermediate appellate courts of the state had authority. to conduct de
novo trials. See Youngstown Mun. Ry. Co. v. City of Youngstown, 70 N.E.2d 649 (Ohio
1946).
38. Skeel, supra note 21, at 328.
39. See WOLFF & BROGAN, supra note 19. See also infra note 42.
40. In regards to appeals by the state from adverse rulings of the circuit courts in some
criminal proceedings, Kentucky law mandates that such appeals shall not act to suspend
further proceedings in the case. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22A.020(4)(a) (Baldwin 1988).
41. It is worthwhile to question whether the orderly processing of cases is aided by such a
strict view of finality, particularly after the supreme court's decision in Polikoff. A very
sound argument can be made that allowing review of some interlocutory orders may actually
aid case processing and prevent protracted and vexatious litigation. Indiana, Michigan and
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is viewed as their concomitant waste of resources and interference in the
orderly processing of cases in the lower courts .
42
B. Application of the Final Order Rule
At first glance, it would seem that determining finality under Ohio law
would not be a particularly complicated task. Unlike the statutes of many
other states that list section-after-section of appealable orders,43 section
2505.02 of the Ohio Code is but two short paragraphs in length.44 The first and
third types of final orders - an order determining an action and preventing
a judgment, and an order vacating or setting aside a judgment - are relatively
clear. 45 An example of the first type of final order is an order that adopts the
verdict of ajury and enters judgment for one of the litigants.46 In such cases,
there is simply nothing left for the trial court to do because all claims against
all parties have been resolved by the judgment. An example of the third
type of final order is an order granting a motion for relief from judgment by
vacating a prior judgment. Often, orders granting a motion for relief from
judgment under Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 60"4 or setting aside a default
Pennsylvania have provided for appeals of several classes of interlocutory orders. Resolution
of the propriety of these orders may greatly aid in disposing of appeals and their underlying
cases in a more timely manner. See supra notes 16-17.
42. Justice Zimmerman once observed that, "The prompt and orderly disposal of litigation
is an object much to be desired, and the entertainment of appeals from various orders made
by the trial court during the progress of the main action is not in pursuance of such object."
Squire v. Guardian Trust Co., 68 N.E.2d 312, 314 (Ohio 1946). For a general overview of the
current structure of Ohio appellate courts, see 16 AKRON L. REV. 1-150 (1982)(containing a
variety of articles on modern court structure and process).
43. See supra notes 16-17.
44. The second paragraph of OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2505.02 (Anderson 1991) states:
When a court issues an order that vacates or sets aside a judgment or grants a new trial,
the court, upon request of either party, shall state in the order the grounds upon which
the new trial is granted or the judgment vacated or set aside.
45. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2505.02 (Anderson 1991).
46. Some other examples of final orders that determine an action and prevent further
judgment include orders granting summary judgment to one litigant in a single claim cause of
action by one plaintiff against one defendant (Whitaker-Merrell v. Carl M. Geupel Constr.
Co., 280 N.E.2d 922 (Ohio 1972)), an order granting summary judgment on less than all of
the claims if it contains the certification required by OHIO R. Civ. P. 54(B) (Union-Scioto
Local School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Unioto Support Ass'n 603 N.E.2d 375 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992)),
an order granting a permanent injunction (Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Bennett, 594
N.E.2d 1 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990)), & (Chiaffitelli v. Price, 265 N.E.2d 306 (Ohio Ct. App.
1970)), and an order dismissing a complaint.
47. OHIO R. CIV. P. 60 allows a trial court to grant relief from a judgment. OHIO R. CIV. P.
60(a) provides that a court may correct clerical mistakes upon motion of one of the parties or
on its own motion. If, however, an appeal is pending, the court may take corrective action
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judgment 48 fall into this category.49  Clear examples of the second type of
final order - those affecting a substantial right in a special proceeding - are
more elusive and difficult to find. Thus, the supreme court correctly per-
ceived in Polikoff v. Adam that guidance and clarification were needed. Un-
fortunately, its efforts would appear to be less than successful.
II. PRE-POLIKOFF
A. The Amato Rule
Exactly what constitutes a final order in a special proceeding has never
been entirely clear.5° Consequently, Ohio courts applied section § 2505.02 of
the Ohio Code and its precursors on a case-by-case basis, leading to a per-
ceived inconsistency as to which orders were final, or even what proceedings
were special. For example, at one time appellate courts held that an order
granting temporary alimony during the pendency of a divorce action was
appealable as an order affecting a substantial right in a special proceeding. 5'
only with leave of the appellate court. OHIO R. Civ. P. 60(B) provides broader grounds for
relief from judgment including (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, (2)
newly discovered evidence not known at the time of the trial, (3) fraud, misrepresentation or
misconduct, (4) the judgment has been satisfied or released, and (5) any other reason justifying
relief. Notwithstanding the power granted by OHIO R. CIv. P. 60, a trial court cannot grant
relief from judgment once an appeal has been filed without a specific remand from the appellate
court. See State, ex rel. Special Prosecutors v. Judges, 378 N.E.2d 162 (Ohio 1978).
Furthermore, it is important to note that in Ohio a motion for reconsideration filed with the
trial court after the entry of its final judgment is a civil nullity. A common mistake of many
practitioners is to file a post-judgment motion for reconsideration only to find that both the
motion and any order sustaining the motion have no effect. See Pitts v. Dept. of Transp., 423
N.E.2d 1105 (Ohio 1981).
48. See GTE Automatic Elec., Inc. v. ARC Indus., Inc., 351 N.E.2d 113 (Ohio 1976).
49. Other examples of orders that are appealable under the third prong of OHIO REV. CODE
§ 2505.02 include an order overruling a motion for relief from judgment (Colley v. Bazell,
416 N.E.2d 605 (Ohio 1980)); and an order granting a new trial (Third Nat'l Bank of Circleville
v. Speakman, 480 N.E.2d 411 (Ohio 1985)).
50. See Missionary Soc'y of Methodist Episcopal Church v. Ely, 47 N.E. 537 (Ohio 1987)
("Our Code does not, as does the Code of New York, specify that every remedy which is not
an action is a special proceeding, nor do our statutes give any definition of an action or
special proceeding.") Id. at 538. See also Kennedy v. Chalfin, 310 N.E.2d 233 (Ohio 1974).
51. Taylor v. Taylor, 57 N.E.2d 931 (Ohio Ct. App. 1943) (order granting alimony pendente
lite and requiring the defendant to vacate the premises is an order affecting a substantial right
in a special proceeding). However, the view expressed in Taylor, 57 N.E.2d at 931 was not
universally held. See Lowman v. Lowman, 129 N.E.2d 213 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955) (order for
temporary alimony pendente lite is not a final order absent some showing of an abuse of
discretion). In Fields v. Fields, 14 N.E.2d 7 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950), an appellate court held
that the enactment of the First General Code of Ohio in 1910 took divorce proceedings out of
the category of "special proceedings" and placed them in the category of general civil actions
thus requiring that all orders in divorce proceedings be final orders. Prior to 1910, divorce
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Likewise, appellate courts had found that an order granting, refusing to grant,
vacating or refusing to vacate a temporary restraining order had many of the
characteristics of an order affecting a substantial right in a special proceed-
ing.52 Appellate courts even had differing positions on whether a class action
actions were specifically exempt from the application of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1854
and thus considered special proceedings. See SWAN & CRITCHFIELD STATUTES 1868, Vol. II,
§ 604. At the time of the adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure, divorce actions were
instituted by filing a "petition" in the office of the clerk of the court of the proper county. See
CURWEN 1853, 51 Laws, 378, § 3.
52. See Wioland v. Mayflower Motors, Inc., 75 N.E.2d 443 (Ohio Ct. App. 1947) (order
dissolving temporary restraining order in an action for specific performance is a final order);
Chicago, St. L. & P.R. Co. v. City of Hamilton, 2 Ohio Cir. Dec. 259 (1888) (an order of the
court of common pleas dissolving a temporary injunction is reviewable before the final
disposition of the case in that court), Robert Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Cleveland S., C. & St.
L. Ry. Co., 7 Ohio N.P. 640 (1899) (position that an order dissolving a temporary restraining
order is too narrow a limitation on the concept of final order in a special proceeding and thus
such an order is immediately reviewable). Cf. Burke v. Railway Co., 17 N.E. 557 (Ohio
1888) (motion to dissolve temporary injunction is a final order entered in a special proceeding);
Hersch v. Home Sav. & Loan Co., 17 N.E.2d 377 (Ohio App. 1938) (order dissolving temporary
restraining order issued to prevent defendant from evicting plaintiff is an appealable final
order). The Supreme Court finally resolved the issue of the appealability of orders affecting
temporary injunctions in Petrus v. Petrus, 199 N.E.2d 579 (Ohio 1964), holding that such
orders were not final and overruling its earlier decision in Burke, 17 N.E. at 557.
More recent Ohio cases have followed the principles of Petrus, 199 N.E.2d at 579
holding that orders granting temporary restraining orders or preliminary injunctions, or refusing
to grant such orders are not appealable final orders. See State ex rel. Tollis v. Cuyahoga Cty.
Ct. App. 532 N.E.2d 727 (Ohio 1988) (court of appeals is without jurisdiction to consider an
appeal from a preliminary injunction because such orders are not final); Refreshment Serv.
Co., Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 406 N.E.2d 1115 (Ohio 1980) (order granting a preliminary
injunction not a final order); Van Camp v. Riley, 476 N.E.2d 1078 (Ohio App. 1984) (order
granting a temporary injunction not a final order).
There is one recognized exception to the rule that temporary restraining orders and
preliminary injunctions are not appealable. In International Diamond Exch. Jewelers, Inc. v.
U.S. Diamond & Gold Jewelers, Inc., 591 N.E.2d 881, 884 (Ohio App. 1991), the Second
District Court of Appeals of Ohio held that injunctive orders constituting a prior restraint on
free speech are immediately appealable. The court held:
Although there is nothing in the opinion of [State ex rel.] Tollis [v. Cuyahoga Cty. Ct.
App. 532 N.E.2d 727 (Ohio 1988)] to suggest that a situation like the one in the case
before us, involving a prior restraint on speech, is distinguishable, we nevertheless
conclude that a preliminary injunction that constitutes a prior restraint upon the exercise
of the right of free speech is a different situation that requires, as an incident of the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution, an immediate appellate forum for the
review of any such injunction. Socialist Party of America v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977).
Id.
There may be some question in the post-Polikoff era as to whether temporary restraining
orders and preliminary injunctions are not immediately appealable. Such proceedings are
arguably special statutory remedies given that they are provided for in OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2727.02 (Anderson 1991), inclusive sections and OHIO R. CIv. P. 65(A).
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certification was appealable. 53 Perceiving the potential for developing an
inconsistent jurisprudence on the finality of orders entered in special proceed-
ings, the supreme court sought to articulate a clearer standard for resolving the
issue. The case that provided that opportunity was Amato v. General Motors
Corp.
54
Amato involved an appeal from an order certifying a class action suit
against General Motors for breach of warranty. The class included all resi-
dents of Ohio who had purchased a 1977 Oldsmobile. The trial court refused
to certify a dealer class, finding that the requirements of commonality and
typicality had not been met." On appeal, the appellate court held that an order
both certifying one class and refusing to certify another class was not a final
order under Ohio Rev. Code §2505.02.56 General Motors appealed to the
supreme court.
After discussing the applicability of Ohio Civ. R. 54(B) 57 to the case, the
court reached the threshold question: Is an order to certify a class under Ohio
Civ. R. 23 an order affecting a substantial right in a special proceeding? The
answer was yes. The majority reasoned that although the term "special pro-
ceeding" had not been defined by the General Assembly, a review of the
53. Compare Roemisch v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., No. 73-CA-16, (Ohio Ct. App.
Nov. 6, 1973) (unreported Miami App.) (order denying class certification not a final order)
with Miles v. N.J. Motors, 291 N.E.2d 758 (Ohio Ct. App. 1972) (order dismissing class
action aspects of a complaint is appealable because the members of the class are left without
an adequate legal remedy). Subsequent to dismissing Roemisch, the Miami County Court of
Appeals sustained a motion to certify a conflict to the Supreme Court of Ohio. That court
ruled that an order determining that an action may not be maintained as a class action is a
final order under the "death knell" theory. Roemisch v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 314
N.E.2d 386 (Ohio 1974). See also Portman v. Akron Sav. & Loan Co., 353 N.E.2d 634 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1975) (an order denying class certification is a final order under OHIO REV. CODE §
2505.02 and appealable under the "death knell" doctrine); Polimeros v. National Account
Sys., Inc., 343 N.E.2d 138 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975) (an order certifying a class but not providing
any procedures to be followed in prosecuting the action is not a final order). See also Amato,
423 N.E.2d at 452.
54. Amato, 423 N.E.2d at 452.
55. To maintain an action as a class action, OHIO R. CIv. P. 23 requires a showing that (1)
the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions
of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class members.
56. Amato v. General Motors Corp., No. 39645, (Ohio Ct. App. May 30, 1980) (unreported
Cuyahoga App.).
57. OHIO R. Civ. P. 54(B), like its federal counterpart, enables a trial court to issue a final
judgment on one or more but fewer than all of the claims of all of the parties upon an express
determination "that there is not just reason for delay." The effect of this "magic language" is
to convert an interlocutory judgment into a final judgment that can be appealed notwithstanding
the pendency of other claims in the trial court.
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court's prior case law indicated that two principles guided the determination
of whether an order affected a substantial right in a special proceeding.
Justice Holmes, writing for the court, stated:
... from our cases discussing what is or is not a special proceeding, we are
able to glean certain principles relating to special proceedings. First and
foremost, this court has been most reluctant to allow interlocutory review
of rulings made by a trial [court] during the pendency of litigation by
holding that such rulings were made in special proceedings. (Citation
omitted)
The second principle, derived from our cases, is that in the small
class of orders deemed to have been made in special proceedings. "...
[a] prime determinant of whether a particular order is one made in a
special proceeding is the practicability of appeal after final judgment." 58
Using these principles as guidance, the supreme court fashioned what
came to be known as the two-pronged Amato balancing test. Before accept-
ing jurisdiction over a seemingly interlocutory order, an appellate court had
to find (1) that the order affected a substantial right, and (2) that the impact
of the order was such that review after final judgment was not practicable and
the waste of judicial resources in accepting an interlocutory appeal was com-
paratively slight.5 9 If the order appealed met the requirements of the test,
it was deemed a final order subject to immediate review.
In creating the Amato test, the supreme court sought to balance the
traditional notion of "final orders" with the reality that some interlocutory
orders simply defied effective review after final judgment. The court admon-
ished appellate courts to remain faithful to the general rule against reviewing
interlocutory orders. 60 Yet the court also recognized that exceptions to
the rule not only existed but had to be judicially recognized, albeit under a
fiction of finality due to the constitutional and statutory provisions defining
appellate jurisdiction. Thus, in the case of a class action certification,
"it [was] not at all certain that judicial resources [were] wasted by allowing
immediate review" but that clearly "a prompt review of an order certifying
a class may conserve judicial resources by allowing reversal of orders which
improperly certify class actions."
6 1
58. Amato, 423 N.E.2d at 452 (citation omitted).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 455. See also Lonigro v. Lonigro, 561 N.E.2d 573 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
61. Amato, 423 N.E.2d at 456.
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B. The Advantage of Amato
The advantage of the Amato test was in its flexibility. Armed with the
Amato test, appellate courts had broader discretion in examining certain types
of interlocutory orders that could cause irreparable harm if the litigants were
forced to wait until after the final judgment for appellate review. At the same
time, the test provided appellate courts with some discretion in determining
what types of orders could be immediately examined. If an appellate court
determined that the importance of conserving judicial resources outweighed
the need for immediate appellate review, or that no substantial right was af-
fected, the order was not entered in a special proceeding and was not imme-
diately appealable.62
Two areas of law were immediately affected by Amato: (1) certain oth-
erwise interlocutory discovery orders, and (2) certain orders in domestic
relations cases. These new classes of interlocutory appealable orders gener-
ally shared a common characteristic: waiting until after the final judgment
to review the order was impractical because no effective relief could be
offered if the order were ultimately found to be erroneous. 63
In the discovery area, orders that compelled the disclosure of certain
types of confidential or privileged information were appealable notwithstand-
ing the appellate courts' aversion to becoming enmeshed in discovery dis-
putes. Generally, Ohio appellate courts avoid reviewing discovery orders on
the basis that interlocutory review creates unnecessary appeals, allows liti-
gants to harass one another by using the appellate process to delay or deter a
trial, and results in appellate courts becoming involved in the housekeeping
affairs of trial courts. 64 However, certain orders required the disclosure of
information that was either legally privileged or strictly confidential. Appel-
late courts rationalized that an immediate appeal of such orders was necessary
because once a party complied and released the information, any harm in the
trial court's order could not be undone on appeal after final judgment. Thus,
under Amato, an order compelling disclosure of a patient's file in a medical
malpractice action was reviewable as an order affecting a substantial right
entered in a special proceeding. 65 Also, an order compelling the disclosure
of a confidential informant in a criminal proceeding was immediately
62. See discussion infra note 96.
63. See Galbreath v. Galbreath, No. 89AP-13, 1989 WL 65389, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. June
13, 1989).
64. Nelson v. Toledo Oxygen & Equip. Co., 588 N.E.2d 789 (Ohio 1992), discussed infra
note 89 and accompanying text.
65. Humphry v. Riverside Methodist Hosp., 488 N.E.2d 877 (Ohio 1986), discussed infra
notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
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reviewable.66 And, an order compelling deposition testimony of a physician
concerning privileged communications under Ohio Rev. Code §2317.02(B)
was a final order.6 7
In the domestic relations area, several orders affecting child custody and
privileged communications became appealable under the Amato test. An
order requiring a custodial parent to execute an authorization allowing the
inspection of her social worker's file was reviewable because the order forced
the parent to waive her right to social worker-client privilege.68 Likewise,
some child custody orders were considered final because, "the child's inter-
est in obtaining even an inconclusive appellate disposition of [the issue of
permanent custody] is sufficiently overwhelming to justify our assumption of
appellate jurisdiction under the test set forth in Amato." 69
In each of these examples, appellate courts reviewed traditionally
interlocutory orders and found that prejudicial error in the trial court's order
could not effectively be corrected on review after final judgment.70 Amato
66. State v. Port Clinton Fisheries Inc., 465 N.E.2d 865 (Ohio 1984).
67. Hollis v. Finger, 590 N.E.2d 784 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990). See also Doe v. Univ. of
Cincinnati, 538 N.E.2d 419 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (order compelling hospital to disclose the
name of a blood donor infected with HIV is final notwithstanding the absence of a physician-
patient privilege).
68. Voss v. Voss, 574 N.E.2d 1175 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
69. Shull v. Shull, No. 89-CA-89, 1990 WL 115983 (Ohio Ct. App. July 31, 1990).
Examples of other orders in a domestic relations action that appellate courts found immediately
appealable included an order compelling one party to pay the prospective attorneys fees of
another party (DeWerth v. DeWerth, Nos. 63320 & 63429, 1993 WL 35588 (Ohio Ct. App.
Feb. 11, 1993)), an order compelling one party to sell assets to pay for the attorneys fees of
the other party (Oatey v. Oatey, 614 N.E.2d 1054 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992)), and an order denying
a natural parent the right to withdraw a previously executed adoption consent (In re Adoption
of Sarah Ruth Brandt, No. 85-12-102, 1986 WL 7907 (Ohio Ct. App. July 14, 1986)).
70. Examples of other final orders under the Amato test include an order dissolving a law
partnership in a manner contrary to the terms of the partnership agreement (Tillberry v. Body,
493 N.E.2d 954 (Ohio 1986)), an order denying a petition to be represented by out-of-state
counsel (Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 477 N.E.2d 630 (Ohio 1985)), an order granting
a motion to disqualify counsel in a civil proceeding (Russell v. Mercy Hosp. 472 N.E.2d 695
(Ohio 1984)), an order granting a defendant's request for a polygraph test at state's expense
(State ex rel Leis v. Kraft, 460 N.E.2d 1372 (Ohio 1984)), an order collaterally imposing
sanctions for frivolous conduct (Shaffer v. Mease, 584 N.E.2d 77 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991)), an
order relating to possession of property in a forcible entry and detainer action (Skillman v.
Browne, 589 N.E.2d 407 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990)), an order overruling a defendant's motion to
dismiss a subsequent criminal charge brought by indictment of the grand jury when the
defendant and state previously entered a plea bargain arrangement in which the defendant
pleaded guilty to lesser charges in exchange for dismissal of the same criminal charge that
formed the basis of the grand jury indictment (State v. Parsons, No. 2345, 1988 WL 28103
(Ohio Ct. App. March 3, 1988)), an order to compel an attorney to produce documents upon
which he has a lien for payment (Foor v. Huntington Nat. Bank, 499 N.E.2d 1297 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1986)), an order overruling exceptions to an inventory because the order withheld certain
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provided a quasi-discretionary appeal based upon the exigency of the circum-
stances and the substantial rights of the parties affected by a trial court order.
7 1
III. THE POLIKOFF DECISION
The great advantage of the Amato test was also perceived to be its great
weakness. Because the test provided appellate courts with some flexibility
and discretion in deciding which interlocutory orders to review, the test was
perceived as encouraging an inconsistent jurisprudence on the issue of what
constituted a special proceeding.7" As the perceived inconsistencies grew, the
supreme court found a need to make a more definitive statement on the sub-
ject. The opportunity to refine Amato came in Polikoff.
A. Polikoff
Polikoff v. Adam involved a shareholder derivative suit brought by
several shareholders against the TRW Corporation and its board of directors.
The shareholders alleged that TRW and one of its principal segments, Infor-
mation Systems and Services, a credit reporting agency, violated the Fair
Credit Reporting Act7 3 by secretly rating consumers' creditworthiness and
then distributing inaccurate and misleading credit information.
At trial, TRW moved to dismiss the complaint asserting that the plain-
tiffs had not complied with rule 23.1 by first demanding that the board of
directors bring the action themselves or by pleading that such a demand would
have been futile. 74 The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and TRW
liquid assets from the estate which could be dissipated before review after final judgment
(Sheets v. Antes, 470 N.E.2d 931 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984)).
71. Amato's quasi-discretionary appeal from some interlocutory orders basically provided
the type of discretionary appeal several other states provide for by statute. See supra notes
14-15.
72. Polikoff, 616 N.E.2d at 215. See also Stewart v. Midwestern Indemn. Co., 543 N.E.2d
1200, 1203-04 (Ohio 1989) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a-1681t.
74. OHio R. Civ. P. 23.1 provides:
In a derivative action brought by one or more legal or equitable owners of shares to
enforce a right of a corporation, the corporation having failed to enforce a right which
may properly be asserted by it, the complaint shall be verified and shall allege that the
plaintiff was a shareholder at the time of the transaction of which he complains or that
his share thereafter devolved on him by operation of law. The complaint shall also
allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he
desires from the directors and, if necessary, from the shareholders and the reasons for
his failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort. The derivative action may
not be maintained if it appears that the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent
the interests of the shareholders similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation.
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appealed. The court of appeals dismissed TRW's appeal for lack of jurisdic-
tion finding that an order overruling a motion to dismiss is not a final order
under section § 2505.02 of the Ohio Code.7 5 TRW then appealed to the Su-
preme Court of Ohio arguing that the trial court's order overruling its motion
to dismiss affected a substantial right in a special proceeding and was thus
immediately appealable.
In examining whether the order TRW appealed was entered in a special
proceeding, the supreme court observed that the application of the Amato
balancing test had become increasingly inconsistent.7 6 The court stated:
This court's decisions in Humphry v. Riverside Methodist Hosp. (ci-
tation omitted) Nelson v. Toledo Oxygen & Equip. Co. (citation omitted);
and Dayton Women's Health Center v. Enix (citation omitted), represent
additional examples of the reasons it is necessary for us to return to a more
predictable and exacting method of determining what constitutes an order
that is entered in a special proceeding. In these cases, the Amato balanc-
ing test was applied to lead to the following disparate conclusions: a dis-
covery order compelling the disclosure of confidential information was a
special proceeding and immediately appealable (Humphry); an order
determining that an action shall or shall not be maintained as a class ac-
tion was entered in a special proceeding (Dayton Women's Health Ctr.);
and an order compelling the production of documents allegedly subject to
the work-product exemption was not made in a special proceeding and
was not a final appealable order (Nelson). The court's application of the
balancing test varied with each case, proving that it is impossible to en-
sure the objective application of subjective criteria. 77
In order to clarify what constituted a "special proceeding," the court
examined the term in its historic context. The court noted that the Code of
Civil Procedure adopted in 1853 abolished the distinction between actions at
law and suits in equity and substituted in their place one form of action called
a "civil action."' 8 Historically, this form of action encompassed those law-
suits that, before the adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure, were denomi-
nated as actions at law or suits in equity. 79 Any proceeding not obtained in an
action or by a suit was a special proceeding or special statutory remedy. Thus,
The action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and
notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to shareholders in such
manner as the court directs. [emphasis added].
75. Polikoff v. Adam, Cuyahoga App. Nos. 63513, 63514, 63515 & 63516.
76. Polikoff, 616 N.E.2d at 215.
77. Id. at 217. Justice Resnick, writing for the majority, argued that Amato produced great
ambiguity resulting in many attorneys filing unnecessary appeals.
78. See generally id. at 216.
79. Id. at 215-16 (citing William Watson & Co. v. Sullivan, 5 Ohio St. 42 (1855)).
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where the code conferred a right and authorized a party to enforce that right
not by filing an action but by the filing a special application to a court for a
judgment or order to enforce the right, the proceeding was a special proceed-
ing.80 The court concluded that because shareholder derivative suits origi-
nated over one hundred years earlier as suits in equity, they were not special
proceedings. 8
Relying on the perceived historical status of special proceedings, the
court rejected the Amato balancing test as inconsistent and prone to subjec-
tive application. 82 In its place the court articulated what it believed was a more
objective, historical-based test for determining whether an order was entered
in a special proceeding.
Hence, we determine that orders that are entered in actions that were
recognized at common law or in equity and were not specially created by
statute are not orders entered in special proceedings pursuant to R.C.
2505.02. Amato is therefore overruled.
83
Turning to the nature of the relief sought, the court noted that the action
was not initiated by a special petition but by filing a lawsuit in the court of
common pleas. The plaintiffs were not seeking to obtain a remedy conferred
by statute nor did the proceedings involve an independent judicial inquiry.84
Furthermore, any error in the trial court's decision overruling TRW's motion
to dismiss for failure to comply with Ohio Civ. R. 23.1 could be preserved
throughout the litigation and reviewed on appeal after final judgment.8" Thus,
80. Polikoff, 616 N.E.2d at 216 (citing In re Estate of Wycoff, 142 N.E.2d 660, 663-64
(Ohio 1957)); See also Missionary Soc. of M.E. Church, 47 N.E. at 537.
81. Polikoff, 616 N.E.2d at 217-18.
82. Id. It is interesting to note that for years there existed in Ohio an "abuse of discretion
appeal" applicable to some types of interlocutory orders. The genesis for this abuse of
discretion appeal was in Webster v. Pullman Co., 200 N.E. 188 (Ohio Ct. App. 1935). In that
case, an appellate court concluded that an order granting a motion for new trial could be
reviewed immediately on a theory of abuse of discretion. The court concluded that review of
the order after the second trial "would be utter folly and its result an unjustifiable judicial
mandate which denied one a fair trial in the first instance and subjected the litigants to needless
expense." This remained the law in Ohio until the supreme court's decision in Klein, 234
N.E.2d at 587. In that case, the supreme court rejected an appeal from an order compelling
the production of a coin-operating dry cleaning machine for inspection. The court found that
interlocutory discovery orders were not appealable holding, "The incongruity of the doctrine
which arose from this confusion becomes apparent when it is realized that the result of the
doctrine is to make all discretionary orders falling within the doctrine appealable, whether
final or interlocutory .... We therefore put to rest the concept that abuse of discretion will,
of itself, render final an otherwise interlocutory order." Id. at 590.
83. Polikoff, 616 N.E.2d at 218.
84. For a discussion on the meaning of the term "independent judicial inquiry," see infra
text accompanying notes 104-07.
85. Polikoff, 616 N.E.2d at 218.
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the court concluded that TRW appealed a non-final order.86
Under the objective-historical test announced in Polikoff, whether an
order is entered in a special proceeding depends upon (1) the historical nature
of the proceedings with particular reference to an action's status at the time
of the adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure, or (2) the involvement of an
independent judicial inquiry in issuing the order. The requirement that the
order affect a substantial right remains in effect.8 7 Strictly read, Polikoff
stands for the proposition that an order entered in a proceeding that would
have been recognized as an action at law or a suit in equity is an order entered
in a civil action and can only be reviewed after the final judgment.88 On the
other hand, an order that affects a substantial right in a proceeding that in-
volves either a statutory proceeding or an independent judicial inquiry is an
order entered in special proceeding and can be immediately appealed notwith-
standing the pendency of other related matters in the trial court. Therefore,
after Polikoff the ability of a litigant to obtain immediate review of an order
depends largely upon the historic status of the underlying action, not the prac-
ticability of obtaining effective review on appeal after final judgment.8 9
B. Problems with Polikoff's Objective-Historical Test
Several problems exist with the Polikoffdecision. First, contrary to the
supreme court's perception, it is not all that clear that Amato produced a radi-
cally discordant jurisprudence. The supreme court in Polikoff pointed to
Humphry v. Riverside Methodist Hosp. ,90 Nelson v. Toledo Oxygen & Equip.
Co.,91 and Dayton Women's Health Center v. Enix92 as examples of the incon-
sistency resulting from use of the Amato balancing test. However, given the
facts in each of these case, the decisions are not really all that inconsistent.
Humphry stood generally for the proposition that an order compelling disclo-
86. Arguably the result in Polikoff was correct. Orders overruling motions to dismiss are
generally not considered final orders because they do not affect a substantial right and in
effect prevent a judgment. The nature of the underlying action was not a special proceeding
because, as the court noted, shareholder derivative suits evolved over one hundred years ago
in equity courts. Polikoff, 616 N.E.2d at 217-18. Thus, the facts in Polikoff presented no
close question of finality - the order was clearly not final. The court could have overruled
the jurisdictional motions and dismissed the appeal without ever needing to completely redefine
appellate practice and procedure with regards to special proceedings.
87. See Bell, 616 N.E.2d at 182.
88. Polikoff, 616 N.E.2d at 213-14.
89. See also infra note 100 and accompanying text.
90. 488 N.E.2d 877 (Ohio 1986).
91. 588 N.E.2d 789 (Ohio 1992).
92. 555 N.E.2d 956 (Ohio 1990).
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sure of privileged or confidential information was immediately appealable. 93
Nelson stood for the proposition that an order compelling disclosure of work-
product - communications not recognized as privileged in Ohio Rev. Code
§23 17.02 - was not reviewable until appeal after final judgment.94 Enix
stood for the proposition that an order determining that an action should or
should not proceed as a class action was an order entered in a special proceed-
ing, a decision consistent with Amato. 95
In each of these examples, the factor that determined whether the appel-
lant could maintain an immediate appeal was a finding by the appellate court
that effective review after final judgment was either available (Nelson) or not
available (Humphry and Enix). Although this determination was somewhat
subjective, there is little evidence that the decisions of reviewing courts were
markedly inconsistent. In the post-Amato, pre-Polikoff era, appellate courts
did not rush to review interlocutory orders thereby producing wild fluctua-
tions in appellate jurisprudence. Rather, appellate courts declined to review
many interlocutory orders proffered for review on Amato-type arguments
opting to follow the general principle that review should take place after fi-
nal judgment.96 For example, in applying the Amato test to discovery disputes,
93. Humphry, 488 N.E.2d at 877.
94. Nelson, 588 N.E.2d at 789.
95. Several problems resulting from the Dayton Women's Health Ctr. decision were later
corrected in an amendment to OHIO R. APP. P. 4. In Dayton Women's Health Ctr., 555
N.E.2d at 956, the supreme court held that because orders certifying a class are final orders in
a special proceeding, the appellant's failure to appeal that order in a timely manner divested
the appellate court of jurisdiction to hear the appeal notwithstanding the pendency of other
proceedings before the trial court. OHIO R. APP. P. 4 was amended by the addition of section
(B) to provide litigants with the option of appealing such an order either within thirty days of
its entry on the journal of the trial court or after the trial court issues its final judgment
disposing of all of the claims of all of the parties.
96. Examples of other types of orders found not appealable under Amato include an order
compelling disclosure of work product information (Nelson, 588 N.E.2d 789), an order vacating
an arbitration award and that orders the parties to select new arbitrators and conduct new
arbitration proceedings (Stewart v. Midwestern Indem. Co., 543 N.E.2d 1200 (Ohio 1989));
an order temporarily suspending the license of a person accused of driving while under the
influence (Columbus v. Adams, 461 N.E.2d 887 (Ohio 1984)); an order overruling a motion
to disqualify counsel (Bernbaum v. Silverstein, 406 N.E.2d 532 (Ohio 1980)); an order
compelling the release of internally generated performance evaluations for operator of
hazardous waste facility (State ex. rel Celebrezze v. Cecos Int'l, Inc., 583 N.E.2d 1118 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1990)); an order granting a preliminary injunction (Arthur Young & Co. v. Kelly,
No. 87AP-800, 1987 WL 17806 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 29, 1987)); an order compelling the
release of trade secrets (Klaban v. Chiefs, Inc., No. CA 91-02-022, 1991 WL 99622 (Ohio Ct.
App. June 10, 1991) but cf. Kuhn & Co. v. Genslinger, No. 12786, 1992 WL 157717 (Ohio
Ct. App. July 8, 1992)); order compelling pre-trial production of hospital incident report
(Schuette v. Flora, No. 7-92-8, 1993 WL 93627 (Ohio Ct. App. March 31, 1993) (citing State
ex rel. Children's Med. Ctr. v. Brown, 571 N.E.2d 724 (Ohio 1991)); order overruling motions
to compel a psychological evaluation of custodial parent and prohibiting her from moving the
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appellate courts rather consistently reviewed only those orders that compelled
the disclosure of legally privileged information or the disclosure of informa-
tion that would invade a non-party's substantive right to privacy.9 7 Thus,
similar cases having similar facts were generally decided along similar lines
regardless of the nature of the underlying action. This may not be the case in
the post-Polikoff era.
Second, rather than being a simple and clear test for determining what
constitutes a special proceeding, the analysis required by Polikoff is complex
and prone to produce inconsistent results because of fine distinctions in juris-
prudential history and the nature of the court proceedings involved in the
underlying action. The supreme court stated in Polikoff that orders entered in
actions that were recognized at common law or in suits in equity, and that
were not specially created by statute, were not orders entered in a special pro-
ceeding.9" Yet the court also intimated that a statutory proceeding involving
adversarial hearings on issues of fact and law and which ultimately results in
a judgment is not a special proceeding.99 Therefore, in determining whether
an order is appealable under Polikoff, courts and litigants must examine
(1) the historical nature of the proceedings, (2) if historically a special pro-
ceeding, the adversarial nature of the proceedings, (3) whether the trial court's
decision constitutes a judgment, and (4) whether the trial court's decision
affects a substantial right.10 Given the complex analysis required by Polikoff,
minor children to Florida (Ashworth v. Powers, No. 90-CA-103, 1991 WL 233917 (Ohio Ct.
App. Nov. 8, 1991)); order imposing sanctions for violation of discovery order (In re Estate
of Maddox, No. 50106, 1986 WL 1731 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 6, 1986)); order imposing sanctions
on attorney for bad faith pleadings under OHIO R. Civ. P. 11 (Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Med.
Ctr., Nos. 60464 & 61166, 1991 WL 191849 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 26, 1991)); divorce decree
that defers consideration of child support (Tismo v. Tismo, No. 1917, 1990 WI 127064 (Ohio
Ct. App. Aug. 28, 1990)); order overruling motion for stay of execution of a judgment (In the
Matter of Megan Nicole Spriggs, No. 89-CA-1803, 1990 WL 54871 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 24,
1990)); order overruling motion to strike or limit a demand for a jury trial under OHIO REV.
CODE § 4121.80(D) (Hayes v. Goodson TSI, Inc., No. 89-CA-34, 1990 WL 51510 (Ohio Ct.
App. Apr. 19, 1990)); and an order overruling motion to dismiss for failure to join an
indispensable party (Banc Ohio Nat'l Bank v. Rubicon Cadillac, Inc., 462 N.E.2d 1379 (Ohio
1984)). These examples are, by no means, all inclusive.
97. See Doe, 538 N.E.2d at 419. See also Humphry, 488 N.E.2d at 877.
98. Polikoff 616 N.E.2d at 218.
99. Id. "The underlying action can be distinguished from a special proceeding in that it
provides for an adversarial hearing on the issues of fact and law which arise from the pleadings
and which will result in a judgment for the prevailing party." Id.
100. As noted, the supreme court held in Bell, 616 N.E.2d 181, that an order affecting a
substantial right has general been perceived to be an order not capable of correction on appeal
after final judgment. Thus, under the Polikoff test as applied in Bell, one must not only look
to the historical and adversarial nature of the trial court proceedings, but also measure the
impact of the trial court's judgment on the rights of the litigants. Notwithstanding the
overruling of Amato in Polikoff, it would appear that the supreme court resurrected some
aspects of the balancing test in Bell.
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litigants cannot rely merely upon the historical nature of an action, but must
also closely examine the very nature of the trial court proceedings.' 0 ' Thus,
several types of special statutory proceedings may not, upon further investi-
gation, fit the definition of a special proceeding articulated in Polikoff not-
withstanding their apparent facial consistency with the principles of the
rule.' °2 The Polikoff test requires a multi-prong analysis that appears so
subtle in its distinctions that it is likely to produce great confusion over what
orders are appealable in what types of proceedings.
10 3
Finally, in Polikoff, the supreme court opened the door to further confu-
sion by stating that a special proceeding may involve an "independent
judicial inquiry" 104 without defining precisely what it meant by this term. The
absence of a clear definition has left appellate courts scrambling to understand
this newest requirement of a special proceeding. For example, in Stevens v.
Grandview Hosp.,105 the Second District Court of Appeals concluded that an
interlocutory order disqualifying counsel in a common law medical malprac-
tice action involved "an independent judicial inquiry" constituting a special
proceeding. Acknowledging that Russell v. Mercy Hosp.106 was suspect in
light of Polikoff, the court nevertheless concluded, "We are not prone, how-
ever, to apply the syllabus of Polikoff in such a sweeping fashion that it ren-
ders all orders in suits that were recognized at common law as not being final
101. See Indiana Ins. Co., 632 N.E.2d at 579 (order declaring the rights and obligations of
the parties is not a final order because the action was not denominated as a declaratory
judgment action notwithstanding having all of the characteristics of such an action).
102. For example, it has been suggested that a wrongful death action under OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2125.01-2125.04 (Anderson 1991), a statutory proceeding is not a special
proceeding since such an action involves adversarial hearings on questions of law and fact.
See generally Irene C. Keyse-Walker, Deciphering Polikoff and the Demise of Amato, 65
CLEVELAND BAR JOURNAL, 10 (Nov. 1993). But see Niemann v. Cooley Nos. C-920470 &
C-920457, 1994 WL 19103 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 26, 1994) (a wrongful death action is a
special statutory proceeding).
103. To illustrate the problem, the First District Court of Appeals has held that what
determines whether an action is a special proceeding is not the historical nature of the
underlying action, but either the nature of the proceeding from which the order arose or the
privilege affected by the order. See Niemann, 1994 WL 19103. By contrast, the Second
District Court of Appeals has held that it is the nature of the underlying action that determines
whether the order was entered in a special proceeding. See Cotterman, Miami App. No. 93-
CA-48, unreported & Uschold v. Community Blood Ctr., Montgomery App. No. 14349,
unreported (1994). Thus, rather than providing a more consistent jurisprudence, courts
applying Polikoff have gone in very different directions on fundamental issues of appellate
jurisdiction.
104. Polikoff, 616 N.E.2d at 218.
105. Stevens v. Grandview Hosp., No. 14042, 1993 WL 420127 (Ohio Ct. App. October
20, 1993).
106. 472 N.E.2d 695 (Ohio 1984) (order granting a motion to disqualify counsel is a final
order entered in a special proceeding).
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appealable orders." 107 Relying in part on the decision in Stevens, the First
District Court of Appeals held that an order to compel the production of privi-
leged information involved an independent judicial inquiry.'08 But how is one
to determine whether an order is appealable as the result of such an inquiry?
What are the elements of an independent judicial inquiry? Is an independent
judicial inquiry an inquiry into an issue tangential to the litigation but outside
the scope of the matters raised in the complaint, like a motion to disqualify
counsel? Or does an independent judicial inquiry involve a more narrow and
exacting exercise of judicial power, for example a contempt proceeding? As
is evident, instead of clarifying the issue of special proceedings, the indepen-
dent judicial inquiry language of Polikoff may lead to an entirely new round
of appeals as unsure litigants seeking to protect their appellate rights attempt
to challenge trial court orders based on this newest element of a special pro-
ceeding. 0 9
The absence of clear guidelines in the application of the Polikoff test has
left appellate courts, practitioners and litigants vulnerable to a more inconsis-
tent jurisprudence than that which the supreme court perceived to be plagu-
ing special proceedings in the past. Although the court espoused a bright-line
test in Polikoff, the test may not be so bright. Because it is the historic nature
of the proceedings - not the exigency of the circumstances or the substantial
rights of the parties - that seems to determine appealability, peculiar results
are unavoidable." 0 How does one explain that an order compelling disclosure
of legally privileged information in one type of proceeding may be immedi-
107. Stevens, 1993 WL 420127, at *2. The validity of both Russell and now Stevens is
doubtful in light of the supreme court's ruling in State ex rel. Keenan v. Calabrese, 631
N.E.2d 119 (Ohio 1994) ("An appeal following conviction and sentence would be neither
impractical nor ineffective since any error in granting the motion [to disqualify counsel in a
criminal proceeding] would, in certain circumstances, be presumptively prejudicial. Flanagan
v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 268 (1984)."). The supreme court in Keenan did not reach
the question of whether a ruling on a motion to disqualify counsel involved an independent
judicial inquiry.
108. Niemann, 1994 WL 19103.
109. Although litigants would not necessarily lose their right to appeal given the changes
in OHIO R. APP. P. 4(B)(5), discussed supra at note 95, they may nevertheless file interlocutory
appeals seeking a determination as to whether the order was entered in an independent judicial
inquiry. See, e.g., Stevens, 1993 WL 420127.
110. One court has concluded that it is not the nature of the underlying action that controls
but the nature of the privilege asserted that determines whether an action constitutes a special
proceeding. See Niemann, 1994 WL 19103. But see Cotterman, Miami App. No. 93-CA-48,
unreported ("Both cases emphasize that to constitute a final order entered in a special
proceeding, the action from which the order arises must itself be in the nature of a special
proceeding."). See also Uschold, Montgomery App. No. 14349, unreported (1994) (motion
to certify the holdings in Niemann and Uschold to the supreme court as being in conflict
sustained March 2, 1994).
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ately reviewed,"' while that exact same order entered in another type of pro-
ceeding can only be reviewed on appeal after final judgment? 112 The only
conclusion that can be reached is that some special statutory proceedings are
by nature civil actions and some statutory proceedings within civil actions are
by nature special proceedings.' The complicated historical analysis required
by Polikoff is neither easy to apply nor prone to produce the consistent results
sought by the supreme court.1 4 Indeed, Polikoff will mean that like appeals
from orders having similar effects may be decided in vastly different ways
based solely on what the appellate court believes to be the historical nature of
the underlying action, the adversarial nature of the proceedings, and the char-
acter of the trial court's judgment.
C. The Discovery Dilemma
The problems with the Polikoff decision are perhaps best illustrated by
examining its potential effects on review of interlocutory appeals of discov-
111. Compare Bell, 616 N.E.2d at 181 with Uschold, Montgomery App. No. 14349,
unreported. See generally discussion infra note 129.
112. See infra text accompanying notes 115-19.
113. See Newton v. Ohio Univ., 633 N.E.2d 593 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993). "A panel of this
court recently read Polikoff and Nease [v. Medical College Hosp., 596 N.E.2d 432 (Ohio
1992)], taken together, as indicating that a ruling which grants immunity pursuant to R.C.
9.86 is an order that affects a substantial right made in a special proceeding." Id. at 596.
114. Examples of special proceedings in the post-Polikoff era may include probate
proceedings under OHIO REV. CODE § 2117.07 allowing for acceleration of the bar against
claims by potential claimants, actions exempted under OHIO R. CIv. P. I(C) from application
of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure (appropriation of property, forcible entry and detainer,
small claims matters under OHIO REV. CODE § 1925, uniform reciprocal support actions,
commitment of mentally ill persons, and all other special statutory proceedings), and some
special remedies provided for in Chapter 27 OHIO REV. CODE including contempt (§ 2705),
amercement (§ 2707), arbitration (§ 2711), international commercial arbitration (§ 2712),
attachment (§ 2715), garnishment (§ 2716), change of name (§ 2717), correction of defects in
instruments or proceedings (§ 2719), declaratory judgments (§ 2721), enjoining or recovering
illegal taxes and assessments (§ 2723), injunctions (§ 2727), lost or destroyed records (§
2729), all the original actions including habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, receivership
(§ 2735), replevin (§ 2737), slander and libel (§ 2739), will contest (§ 2741), actions before
the court of claims (§ 2743), and political subdivision tort liability (§ 2744). See also Cuyahoga
Metro. Hous. Auth. v. Jackson, 423 N.E.2d 177 (Ohio 1981) (OHIO R. Civ. P. 54(B) not
applicable to the special proceeding of forcible entry and detainer). However, some of these
actions may not be special proceedings under Polikoff if the actions, although now statutory
proceedings, were known at common law. An example might include a slander suit. Arguably
divorce actions may now be special proceedings because such actions were specifically
exempted from the Code of Civil Procedure at the time of its adoption. "Until the legislature
shall otherwise provide, this code shall not affect proceedings ... under statutes relating to
dower, divorce or alimony .. " 1853 Ohio Laws 161, 161. See also State ex rel. Papp v.
James, 632 N.E.2d 889, 894-895 (Ohio 1994)(there was no common law right to divorce
therefore divorce is a specal proceeding); Fields, 94 N.E.2d at 9-10. But, cf Fown v. Fown,
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ery orders. In the past, some interlocutory discovery orders were immediately
appealable under the Amato test.I1 5 The determining factor was whether the
order affected a substantial right and whether the order was reviewable on
appeal after final judgment.' 16 Thus, as discussed earlier, Amato provided
appellate courts with some discretion in determining which orders should be
immediately reviewed because of their practical effect and which orders could
await review until after final judgment.' 17 An order compelling a physician
to violate the physician-patient privilege was seen as so potentially injurious
to the substantive rights of the patient that it required immediate appellate
review. 1 8 On the other hand, an order compelling production of work-prod-
uct was not so injurious as to be incapable of correction on review after judg-
ment. 1 19
However, after Polikoff, the appealability of orders compelling disclo-
sure of legally privileged information in common law actions is in great
doubt. 20 For example, in Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati 1 2' a pre-Polikoff decision,
an appellate court held that an order to compel a blood center to release the
name of a donor whose blood was infected with the HIV virus was appealable
No. 9-93-36, 1993 WL 542479, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 28, 1993) ("The fact that divorce
and custody are now proceedings specifically controlled by application of the relevant statutes,
does not change the fact that actions for divorce and custody were at common law.")
115. See supra text accompanying notes 64-67.
116. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 61-63.
118. Russell, 427 N.E.2d at 695.
119. Nelson, 588 N.E.2d 789.
120. See Textron Fin. Corp. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. No. 16434, 1993 WL 417005
(Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 13, 1993) (discovery order entered in a common law breach of contract
action not appealable under Polikoff); Cotterman Miami App. No. 93-CA-48, unreported
(discovery order entered in common law medical malpractice action is not appealable under
Polikoff); State v. David Myers, No. 93-CA-20, 1994 WL 12470 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 19,
1994) (order compelling the release of grand jury minutes to defendant is not a final order in
light of Polikoff). See also State v. Lambert, 632 N.E.2d 511 (Ohio 1994) (judgment of
appellate court in State v. Lambert, No. 13483, 1993 WL 79273 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 16,
1993), that reviewed propriety of interlocutory discovery order requiring prosecuting attorney
to provide discovery pursuant to local rule of trial court and finding that rule unconstitutional
as in conflict OHIO R. CRIM. P. 16 vacated and appeal dismissed for want of a final order).
See also Horton v. Addy, 631 N.E.2d 123 (Ohio 1994) (judgment of appellate court in Horton
v. Addy, No. 13524, 1993 WL 15631 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 25, 1993), reviewing propriety of
interlocutory discovery order requiring plaintiff to turn over to opposing counsel or submit to
the trial court for examination certain medical records vacated and appeal dismissed for want
of a final order). See also Garry Cramer v. Greene County Bd. of Education, Greene App.
No. 94 CA 69, unreported (Aug. 12, 1994)(under Polikoff, an order compelling a defendant in
a civil action to answer deposition questions even after he has invoked his Fifth Amendment
right against self incrimination is not an order entered in a special proceeding and is thus
reviewable only on appeal after final judgment).
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under the Amato test. The court reasoned that the order invaded the donor's
right to privacy and that any harm in releasing the name could not be corrected
on appeal after final judgment. Immediate review was deemed necessary to
protect the donor's substantive right to privacy notwithstanding the absence
of a physician-patient relationship."' 2
The very same situation recently confronted an appellate court, but the
outcome was vastly different. In Uschold v. Community Blood Center,I23 the
Second District Court of Appeals dismissed a case having virtually the same
facts as those confronted by the court in Doe. The court was asked to review
a discovery order compelling a community blood center to disclose of the
name of a donor whose HIV infected blood was allegedly given to the husband
of the plaintiff resulting in his death. In rejecting the appeal, the appellate
court stated:
We do not, however, view discovery orders as special proceedings
apart from the trial of the issues raised in the case. We acknowledge the
anomaly pointed out by the Hamilton County Court of Appeals that the
Polikoff syllabus, standing alone, would seem to require that
... if an order compelling disclosure of privileged material were made
in a wrongful death action, which is statutory, it would be made in a
special proceeding, but the same order in a common law negligence
action would not be.
Niemann, supra at 10. However, this anomaly will have to resolved, if at
all, by the Supreme Court or the General Assembly.
We adhere to our previous decisions and conclude that the order ap-
pealed from was not entered in a special proceeding and is therefore not
appealable. 124
Assuming that the appellate court is correct in concluding that discov-
ery orders in common law proceedings are not immediately appealable, not-
withstanding the nature of the privilege asserted, attorneys and litigants
against whom such orders run are left with only two choices. They can either
comply with the order and produce legally privileged or confidential informa-
tion resulting in potentially incalculable damage to their case, or refuse to
comply with the order and risk being found in contempt of court. Clearly,
neither alternative is attractive. In the former situation there may be no way
121. 538 N.E.2d 419 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988).
122. Id.
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of undoing on appeal the prejudicial harm resulting from the disclosure of the
information. Parties possessing privileged information tend not to forget the
details even if an appellate court ultimately instructs them to do so. In the
latter situation, litigants and their attorneys must make a deliberate choice to
disregard a court order and risk being found in contempt. 25 Attorneys who
recommend that their clients ignore court orders to compel discovery could
face disciplinary proceedings for deliberately flaunting a court ruling. 26 The
litigants could likewise face massive fines for their recalcitrance and to com-
pel their compliance. Further, could an attorney who recommends noncom-
pliance with a discovery order face a malpractice suit if the appellant is found
in contempt as a result of that recommendation, appeals and loses the ap-
peal? 27 Thus the court's decision in Polikoff creates an untenable situation
for any party in a common law or equity action against whom an order to
compel discovery runs.
The same situation would not confront litigants in a declaratory judg-
ment action. Because this action is a special proceeding,'28 the only issue for
resolution is whether an order to compel discovery affects a substantial right.
Clearly, an order to compel disclosure of legally privileged or confidential
information affects a substantial right.'29 It would be immediately appealable
125. It is the law in Ohio that in appealing from an order finding a party in contempt and
imposing a sanction the party against whom the contempt runs can also challenge the propriety
of the underlying order that was violated even if the underlying order is interlocutory. See
Smith v. Chester Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 396 N.E.2d 743 (Ohio 1979) (Where violation of a
non-appealable, interlocutory order results in contempt, the appellate court can review the
propriety of the interlocutory order.)
126. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-106(A)(1980) states:
A lawyer shall not disregard or advise his client to disregard a standing rule of a tribunal
or a ruling of a tribunal made in the course of a proceeding, but he may take appropriate
steps in good faith to test the validity of such rule or ruling. [emphasis added].
Query whether counseling a client to ignore an order to compel discovery specifically with
hopes of being found in contempt so that the order itself can be immediately appealed
constitutes "tak[ing] appropriate steps in good faith to test the validity of such rule or ruling"?
127. Cf. McDade v. Spencer, 600 N.E.2d 371 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
128. See General Acc. Insur. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 540 N.E.2d 266, 271-72 (Ohio
1989).
129. A concrete example of the inconsistency inherent in applying the Polikoff test to
discovery disputes is the supreme court's decision in Bell, 616 N.E.2d at 181, a case decided
on the same day as Polikoff. In that case, the court implied that an interlocutory discovery
order entered in a special proceeding could be immediately appealed if the party seeking
review could establish that the order affected a substantial right. The movant sought disclosure
of privileged information to proceed on a motion for prejudgment interest under OHIO REV.
CODE § 1343.03(C). The court concluded that such a motion was a special proceeding because
the remedy of prejudgment interest was not known at common law and is presently controlled
purely by statute. However, the court also concluded that the particular discovery order
appealed was not final because it did not affect a substantial right as any asserted privilege
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with the party affected by the order obtaining immediate relief should the
appellate court determine the order is erroneous. The attorneys and litigants
against whom the order runs would not have to choose between disclosure and
contempt, as Polikoff forces their counterparts in a common law action to do.
Given this result, one must wonder whether Polikoff's more exacting historic
test will produce a more rational jurisprudence, or simply produce a jurispru-
dence of more confounding irrationality.
CONCLUSION
To constitute a final order in a special proceeding, practitioners and
judges must determine (1) that a substantial right is involved and (2) that the
action is in the nature of special proceeding under the Polikoff test. Although
the test seems rather straightforward, great ambiguity surrounds its applica-
tion. 30 Some statutory proceedings may not be special proceedings and some
would be protected by the trial court conducting the in camera examination it had already
ordered. The supreme court suggested, however, that interlocutory discovery orders entered
in a special proceeding could be immediately appealed if the appellant can establish that a
substantial right is affected by the order. ("An order which affects a substantial right has been
perceived as one which, if not immediately appealable, would foreclose appropriate relief in
the future." Bell, supra at 63.). Thus, one can reasonably conclude in light of Bell that an
order entered in a special proceeding that affects a substantial right (that is, cannot be remedied
on appeal after final judgment) can be reviewed while that same order entered in a common
law tort action cannot be immediately reviewed given the Polikoff test. It is interesting to
note that the underlying proceeding in Bell giving rise to the motion was a common law
action. In the aftermath of Bell and Polikoff, it is possible to have special proceedings within
the context of a common law action. Theoretically, orders related to the issues surrounding
the special proceeding would be immediately appealable while orders related to the common
law issues could be reviewable only after the final judgment, even though all orders were
entered in the same "action."
130. To clarify the appealability of orders in light of Polikoff, several proposals have been
made to amend OHIO REV. CODE § 2505.02 and several other provisions of Chapter 25 of the
Revised Code. One proposal offered by Judge Mike Fain, Second District Court of Appeals,
would amend OHIO REV. CODE § 2505.02 to read as follows:
The following are final orders that may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or reversed,
with or without retrial:
(A) a judgment or order of a trial court that resolves all pending claims in the action, that
terminates the action on the docket of the trial court, or that prevents a judgment;
(B) a judgment or order of a trial court granting a new trial, vacating or modifying a
judgment, or otherwise granting relief from a judgment;
(C) a judgment or order of a trial court entered after the entry of final judgment in the
action, if it affects a substantial right of a party entitled to appeal; and
(D) a judgment or order of a trial court entered before the entry of final judgment in the
action, if the party seeking to appeal cannot wait until the entry of final judgment in the
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proceedings within a common law or equity action may be special proceed-
ings. 3' What constitutes a special proceeding after Polikoff cannot be safely
determined. What can be safely said is that rather than clarifying the issue,
Polikoff has produced an atmosphere that may encourage greater inconsis-
tency than that perceived in the aftermath of Amato. Further, Polikoff will
foreclose review of several classes of orders for which there is no effective
remedy on appeal after final judgment. The greatly sought after consistency
in the area of final orders has proven elusive again.
action without losing, as a practical matter, the ability to vindicate a substantial right
affected by the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken.
When a court issues an order that vacates or sets aside a judgment or grants a new trial,
the court, upon the request of either party, shall state in the order the grounds upon
which the new trial is granted or the judgment vacated or set aside.
Compare with current OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2505.02 (Anderson 1991).
In addition to amending OHIO REV. CODE § 2505.02, two new sections would be
added to Chapter 25 to (1) clarify the application of OHIO R. CIV. P. 54(B), and (2) permit
interlocutory appeals in certain circumstances. Proposed new OHIO REV. CODE § 2505.021
would read as follows:
When a civil action involves multiple claims, a judgment or order that is final with
respect to one or more, but less than all, of the claims is a final appealable order if
the claims resolved have been severed from the remaining claims by the trial court
for purposes of appeal in accordance with Civil Rule 54(B), or otherwise in
accordance with applicable rules of procedure.
Proposed new OHIO REV. CODE § 2505.022 would read as follows:
A judgment or order of a trial court entered before the entry of final judgment in
the action is a final appealable order if it affects a substantial right of a party and
all of the parties and the trial court have signed an entry certifying that an immediate
appeal from the judgment or order will contribute to the prompt and efficient
disposition of the action. The Court of Appeals may find that a judgment or order
so certified is not a final appealable order, and may dismiss the appeal, if it shall
find that an immediate appeal will not contribute to the prompt and efficient
disposition of the action.
For a further discussion on these proposed amendments to Chapter 25 of the Ohio
Code, see Valita R. Kreiss, The Murky Waters of Final Appealable Orders - Clarified by
Polikoff v. Adam? XLIII DAYTON BAR BRIEFs No. 6, 6 (February 1994). Compare these
proposed amendments to Chapter 25 of the Ohio Code with Ind. R. App. P. 4(B) cited supra
at note 16.
131. See discussion supra note 129. See generally Keyse-Walker, supra note 102.
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